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Biographical Note 
 
Leon Billings was born in Helena, Montana on Novembr 19, 1937.  His parents were Harry and 
Gretchen Billings. His father was an editor and publisher of a progressive newspaper; his mother 
was a crusading journalist.  He graduated from highschool in Helena, Montana in 1955, and 
then attended Reed College for one year in Portland, Oregon.  He completed his undergraduate 
studies and took graduate courses toward an M.A. at the University of Montana at Missoula.  
Billings worked as a reporter and organizer for farm groups in Montana and California.  He met 
his first wife, Pat, in California.  They married in Montana and moved to Washington, D.C. on 
January 4, 1963.  While in Washington, Billings worked for the American Public Power 
Association for three years as a lobbyist.  In March 1966, he was offered and accepted a job on 
the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution on the Public Works Committee.   He worked for 
Muskie helping to coordinate work on environmental policy.  From 1966 to 1978, he served as 
Muskie’s chief of staff.  He served on the Democrati  Platform Committee staff in 1968 and in 
1974, was co-chairman of a Democratic National Committee task force on Energy and the 
Environment.  He later served as President of the Edmund S. Muskie Foundation; a tax-exempt 
foundation endowed with a $3 million appropriation from Congress to perpetuate the 
environmental legacy of Senator Muskie. 
 
 
Scope and Content Note 
 
Interview includes discussions of: Clean Air Act; Clean Water Act; 1972 presidential campaign; 
1977 amendments; the auto industry and auto emissions tandards; Senator Muskie’s legislative 
skills and strategies; his relationships with other committee members; and anecdotes during this 
time period. 
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Transcript 
 
Don Nicoll:   It is Monday, the 16th of September, 2002, and we are interviewing Leon Billings 
at 1625 K Street NW in his offices.  The interviewer is Don Nicoll.  Leon, let's go back to 1970 
or '69, whenever you started work on what became the Clean Air Act of 1970.  What was the 
major issue that, from your point of view, the country had to deal with in that legislation? 
 
Leon Billings:   Well, in 1969 Muskie introduced legislation to nationalize the air quality 
standards process.  And the '67 legislation, to the best of my recollection, basically required a 
regional process for developing air quality standards.  And Muskie wasn't satisfied with the 
progress, and so he introduced a broadening piece of legislation, but it was very much a bill that 
built on the ‘63, ‘65, ‘67 acts. 
 
And I can't remember exactly when, but at some point in the '69-'70 period, I got leaked a set of 
fourteen or seventeen bills that the Nixon administration proposed to introduce on clean air.  And 
which, by the way, was interesting because there was ah . . . .  I immediately gave them to Ned 
Kenworthy of the New York Times, who immediately began writing front page stories about 
these various initiatives that Nixon was talking about, most of which were contrary to the 
direction that Muskie was going in.  And the White House had a fit, to the point that Richard 
Nixon called the FBI in to investigate the Office of Management and Budget and so on. 
 
What they didn't know was I actually got this set of bills from a civil servant who worked in 
NIOSH, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, who was at best a fifth level 
bureaucrat, probably a GS12 or 13, young fellow I'd known for years.  I mean they just, this, the 
vetting process for legislation took it all the way down into the bureaucracy.  But there was a 
scandal, a reported scandal, because of the Nixon pe ple's fury with this legislation getting out.  
At that point - 
 
DN:    They were able to get close to the source? 
 
LB:    No, they never got close, never got close.  Oneof the things that I learned, Don, and I 
think I learned it from Dick Murphy who was Bob Stafford's long time legislative director, was 
that when you make the decision to leak something, you always make the decision to lie about 
who leaked it, and you never admit to having done it, or you never admit to knowing who has 
done it.  In this case, actually, interestingly enough, no one ever asked me where I got it, and I 
wouldn't have told them had they done so. 
 
But he had int-, and I think, you know, retrospectively, we made a mistake, but Nixon had 
proposed national emission standards, he proposed national ambient air quality standards.  He 
proposed a number of, you know, what would be seen in the context of today's Republicans, as 
very progressive policies.  But it was clear that te Nixon White House saw Muskie as a 
principal adversary in '72, and they wanted to steal his preeminent issue.  So that was one set of 
facts. 
 
We held hearings in '69.  Muskie used the hearings to belittle some of the Nixon proposals.  He 
used the hearings, Phil Hart, his really dear friend, had put in a bill drafted by a lawyer named 
Joe Sachs, which would allow class action suits against polluters.  And Muskie was totally 
offended by that concept, so he used the hearings to lay a basis for dealing with that. 
 
And then in 1970, we had, we first, in 1970, after w  came back, we had to deal with the 
conference on the oil pollution legislation.  The so-called Water Quality Improvement Act, 
which had been sitting around for a year and a half because the House didn't want to act on the 
bill, which established liability for oil spills and for chemical spills (and perhaps the most radical 
environmental bill written to date, in some respects is still one of the most radical environmental 
laws), until there was oil tanker that broke up in Tampa Bay, which happened to be in the district 
of a guy named [William Cato] Cramer who was a conservative Republican congressman, but 
the ranking member in the House Public Works Committee. So all of a sudden that bill began to 
move, and we got it through to the, on the president's desk in April. 
 
And then we began to try to mold a Clean Air Act.  Now the House passed relatively early on 
what was left of the administration's clean air package, which included, among other things, 
regulation of lead in gasoline.  We, my recollection s that we started meeting in camera in the 
summer of '70.  And at one point there was a very sious air pollution episode in New York and 
there was a lot of talk about excess deaths associated with it. 
 
And we had an interesting committee, probably the most interesting committee that we had.  
Senator William [Belser] Spong [Jr.] of Virginia, who at one point in one of those sessions said, 
you know, “Ye gods, people are out there dying and we're sitting in here having a debating 
society.” 
 
Tom Eagleton of Missouri, who had come to Congress two years before, who had just come 
through the coal mine health and safety debate on the Labor Committee, and was furious that 
there were no deadlines and that there was no way to keep Congress and the government 
accountable.  Howard Baker of Tennessee, who was a technocrat, a protege if you would, of a 
guy named Al [Alvin] Weinberg who was at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 
 
We had John Sherman Cooper who was once described by my colleague Tom Jorling as the most 
ethical man he ever met, but a guy who even in his later years was willing to experiment with 
legislation.  We had Birch Bayh of Indiana, fresh off his battles with Nixon on Supreme Court 
nominees.  And then we had some relatively conservative folks, but it was a good committee, 
and it was a committee of thinkers. 
 
And Caleb Boggs of Delaware was the ranking member, and he was a very dear man who almost 
without exception voted with Muskie, and almost never asked for anything.  He would say things 
like, “Well, I need to check that with the garden clubs back home,” because they were the 
influential environmental lobby in the state of Delaware in 1970. 
 
The issues were, no, Muskie told his colleagues that the premise on which the federal 
government can exert a dominant role in the clean up of air pollution would have to be 
protection of public health.  And you will recall, and history will show, that in the earliest Clean 
Air Act he had written a provision which required the Public Health Service to develop scientific 
analyses of the impact of air pollution on health, so-called air quality criteria documents.  And 
finally, in '67, '68, '69, those documents had begun to be published. 
 
And I remember one occasion, you and I were in a meeting with Muskie and Dr. C. C. Johnson 
of the Public Health Service, in which they were talking about how these air quality criteria 
documents should be formatted.  And Muskie said, in essence, “I don't give a damn how you do 
it, I just want you to say that there is a number that reflects the best scientific evidence at the 
point at which adverse health effects occur.”  Which became, which actually, Public Health 
Service wrote into the documents, and they became the premise on which air quality standards 
were adopted at these various regional conferences around the country.  That conversation 
probably took place in '67 or so. 
 
Well by '70, those documents were out there, standards had been adopted around the country, all 
the standards, air quality standards, in many cases were much more rigorous than any of the 
business community wanted.  And they got Nixon to propose that air quality standards be 
adopted nationally rather than regionally.  And I'm not exactly sure of the course of events, but at 
one point in the mark-up sessions, Caleb Boggs says, “Well, you rejected everything else Nixon 
wants, how about nationalizing air quality standards?”  And Muskie went along with it.  And I 
don't think any of us thought through the implications of that move because what it did, we were 
to learn later, was effectively take citizens out of the clean air movement and turn it over to the 
technocrats.  But in any event, the, for Muskie the drive was to have a public health standard 
against which to measure the success of air pollutin control programs, so he was willing to 
make that compromise. 
 
Well, the unique, this was, there were, there was my elf and Tom Jorling who were the two 
critical staff players in the room.  And really, with the exception of Barry Meyer with Senator 
Randolph, nobody, no other staff even participated in the open discussion.  And there was 
Eagleton, Baker, and Randolph, who kept trying to slow things down. Cooper who became 
enamored with the idea of writing a piece of landmark social legislation.  Bayh, who was a 
critical supporter but not an innovator.  Joe Montoya, whose staff person, Karl Braithwaite, had 
his proxy, so Montoya voted for everything Muskie wanted and I'm sure he never knew what he 
was voting on.  But that was sort of the core group, plus Boggs. 
 
Eagleton declaimed at some length about the fact tht the government kept announcing these 
major massive programs, but there weren't any deadlines so the public never knew whether they 
were going to be achieved.  And so he demanded and insisted that the committee adopt deadlines 
for the achievement of clean air and other objectivs, including clean cars. 
 
And Baker, who was, Howard Baker, who was instrumental i  these discussions, felt that the 
committee had a responsibility to not press beyond the limits of technology.  And so there sort of 
developed a dynamic where Muskie saw air quality standards and deadlines as technology 
forcing, and Baker who saw technology as the limitations on how far you could go to achieve 
standards.  And in many respects Muskie won that argument, and Baker supported it, though 
Baker had qualms about the leaving sort of open-ended, ‘what happens if you can't get there in 
the time provided’. 
 
And Spong, who I meant to mention, Spong was just ab olutely essential, because number one 
he was a southerner, which meant that he was helping moderates and liberals shape a bill.  And 
he very badly wanted to have a Clean Air Act which said to the American people that we were 
going to clean air up in a time certain.  So the, at one point in August, Muskie, the committee 
was meeting and they were talking about auto emission controls.  And they had basically come 
up with the structure of the Clean Air Act, and what they were going to do to sort of facilitate 
this regional approach that had been established in '67, and how they were going to integrate 
national standards into it.  And that left two open questions: one was auto emission standards, 
and the other was how to deal with new sources of pollution. 
 
There was a lobbyist, now retired in North Carolina, for the steel workers named Jack Sheehan 
who had fought the OSHA wars.  Sheehan was convinced that if you allowed too much 
regionalism in pollution control, you would create havens for dirty air or dirty water, and the 
governors would be able to sell their states as a good place to come and pollute.  The solution of 
that, a solution crafted in its entirety by Ed Muskie after a, Muskie and Sheehan had a testy 
relationship having to do with some banking bill, what was it, the Truth in Lending.  And I think 
several years before that Muskie had effectively thrown Sheehan out of the office. 
 
But they came together on new source performance standards basically saying that if you are a 
new source, you had to use the best available control technology so that at least there was a level 
playing field.  Not to say that states couldn't go further than that, but there would be a minimum 
standard of technological . . . .  And that was extremely important because it really eliminated 
labor's reservations about the legislation. 
 
Now, auto emissions were a separate issue.  Gaylord Nelson, with the support of the United Auto 
Workers and the Sierra Club, introduced a bill to ban the internal combustion engine.  And 
Muskie, sensing the value, the political value and the political impetus for environmental 
protection, he saw this issue as much larger than his colleagues, grabbed on to that bill and said 
to his colleagues, we've got to do something about auto emissions or else we're going to have 
Gaylord Nelson ban the internal combustion engine as an amendment on the Senate floor. 
 
So then the question was, ‘Well what can we do?’  And Muskie instructed me at a mark-up to 
find out from the administration, which at this time was the National Air Pollution Control 
Administration under John Middleton, what level of reduction of auto emissions we would have 
to achieve in order to remove the automobile from its contribution to urban air pollution, after 
the fleet had been changed.  I called Middleton.  The next morning he called me back at about 
five minutes to ten, we had a ten o'clock mark-up.  And while he dictated I knocked out on my 
old manual typewriter a one page memo to Muskie which, in effect, articulated the Barthrow-
Minovsky, who were a couple of scientists, I think they were Public Health Service scientists 
who had done an analysis of this, as "the best technical information" available.  And I knocked 
out this memo which said, basically, ninety percent r duction in emissions would be required.     
So I took it down to the committee, I was actually late, which never set well with Muskie, 
presented the memo, typos and all, and he read it to the committee.  And the committee adopted 
it. 
 
And then there ensued a discussion of what happens if they can't make it, the [Howard] Baker 
theory.  And Randolph, of course, wanted to have a two, at least a two year delay, Muskie 
wanted a one year delay.  And they did battle, Muskie ultimately prevailing.  And so on the eve 
of the congressional, I've been saying August, I meant July, because on the eve of the August 
recess, Muskie and the committee, subcommittee came out and had a press conference in which 
it was announced that the committee had adopted this leg slation with deadlines. 
 
But the most controversial provision was the auto emission standards.  The auto companies went 
ape, and Muskie and the committee promptly left town for the August recess.  Tom Jorling and I 
had a series of meetings with industry to satisfy Randolph's demand that we hear the views of 
interested parties.  A Ford vice president called Tom Jorling a Communist for wanting to 
produce a Volkswagon type car, which I thought was an interesting mixed metaphor.  And then 
we promptly went on vacation.  And when we came back, the full committee reported the bill 
and it went to the floor. 
 
Now, there was one other important, this bill had a number of important revisions, and by the 
way, the printed copy of the bill was thirty-eight pages long.  And I like to compare it to the fact 
that the printed copy of the 1990 amendment was three undred and thirty-eight pages long.  
This was the, during the course of the debate in committee, Tom Jorling, the minority counsel, 
had come up with it, we had proposed to the committee, in addition to a fairly substantial 
enforcement mechanism, the adoption of a citizen's suit provision, and we had convinced Muskie 
that this was a viable option.  In part that came about because neither Tom nor I, nor the senator 
for that matter, liked Phil Hart's class action provision. 
 
And so when that provision was raised in committee, h re was a fair amount of debate over it.  
And Muskie finally said, “Well, gentlemen, it's either this or Phil Hart's bill.  Now, if you want 
to fight Phil Hart on the floor of the Senate on his class action provision be my guest, but I think 
we ought to deal with it here in committee.”  And of c urse, if you look back over the past thirty 
plus years, that provision may have been the single most important provision of law in terms of 
making it work. 
 
 [We] went to the floor, had basically a debate on the amount of time for the standards, and a 
debate on the, and a debate with [Robert Paul] Bob Griffin of Michigan, and a debate with 
Roman [Lee] Hruska [R-NE] who opposed the citizen suit provision.  Passed the bill 
unanimously, went to conference with the House, thoug t we had an agreement, recessed for the 
election, came back for a lame duck session after the election, and the House had welched on the 
agreement.  The House agreed before we left to adopt the Senate auto emission standards.  We 
came back and they'd welched. 
 
And we went into a series of conferences and discussion  which ultimately, a couple things 
happened.  One was, we managed to leak to Jack Anderson, who was, for the purpose, that's a 
columnist, a gossip columnist if you would, a story about the fact that one of the House 
conferee's family owned a huge auto dealership in Oklahoma City, and therefore was likely 
conflicted on the issue of the Clean Air Act.  And after that story ran, Jarman never showed up 
for another conference, and Harley Staggers had his proxy. 
 
And we rolled up to adjournment, and Muskie told Staggers, it was Staggers, Ancher Nelsen 
from Minnesota, the ranking Republican, Paul Rogers, Jarman, and I think Jim Broyhill of North 
Carolina but I'm not sure, and said, “Well gentlemen, I'm perfectly willing to come back here 
next year if you want to take back to the public that you were unwilling to accept this legislation. 
 But I can assure you, it'll be a tougher bill next year.”  And got up and left.  And we were called 
back, and I'm not sure but it wasn't the same day, and Staggers informed Muskie that by a vote of 
three to two, the House had receded to the Senate provision, and he had voted Jarman's proxy for 
the Muskie bill. 
 
[The legislation] went to the White House, the White House might have got, well, it's gone into a 
black hole.  Jennings Randolph got very excited about the fact that the president wasn't going to 
sign the bill.  On December 31st, sometime in that period, Randolph and Cooper had gone to the 
White House, the White House announced that they were going to sign the bill, and they 
deliberately didn't invite Muskie to the signing ceremony.  So the headline in the Washington 
Post the next story said, “Nixon signs Clean Air Act, Muskie not Invited”.  The irony of it was 
was Muskie was in Maine for the Christmas holidays nd he wouldn't have come back for it 
anyway.  But I was later told by one of the Nixon White House staff people that, "they left the 
Clean Air Act sitting on one of the radiators in the Oval Office, and it obviously slipped off and 
fell behind it, because they didn't know where it was, and when they finally found it they signed 
it."  Anyway, that's sort of, that's a quick story.  Muskie . . . . 
 
DN:    Let me ask you a question about that period.  How did the White House play its role as 
the legislation was working its way both through the Senate committee and then in the 
conference? 
 
LB:    Actually, in the initial consideration of the lgislation, Bob Finch of California was 
secretary then of Health, Education and Welfare, and his undersecretary was a guy named John 
[G.] Veneman, who was also from California.  And they were very supportive of clean air 
initiatives and what Muskie was trying to do, and so on.  Now, that may have been in part 
because when this all started in '69, Muskie was not the putative front runner, it wasn't until after 
Chappaquiddick that Muskie became the front runner.  The, because there were no hearings per 
se, on the structure that the Senate committee reported.  It was, it all evolved in mark-up, the 
whole thing evolved in mark-up.  The administration was virtually not involved.  I don't even 
think the Republicans were talking to him about what we were doing. 
 
The, after we went to conference, and after we had gotten what we understood to be an 
agreement from the House conferees on the auto emissions issues, among others, and as I 
mentioned, we went out for election recess.  When w came back the conference began to meet 
on November, I believe November 19th because I believ , I remember that day because it was 
my birthday, there was a letter from Elliot Richardson, who was by then secretary of HEW, 
opposing the Muskie bill, with particular focus on the auto emissions provisions.  And that 
became the basis for the House resistance to doing what we wanted to do.  And so it, it changed 
the politics of the bill pretty substantially.  The EPA had been created officially on December 6th 
of that year, had really no role to play, it was all HEW.  And there wasn't any, I'm trying to 
remember whether, I don't think we had any interaction at all with any of the legislative liaison 
from the White House. 
 
DN:    So they did not attempt to negotiate directly with you or with the Senator? 
 
LB:    Not to my knowledge, I don't recall, I don't recall that there was any, anything more than 
that letter.  There may have been, but the, I know that the, when we came back from the August 
recess, the heads of the auto companies had demanded  m eting with Muskie, and that was a 
humorous meeting.  You were there, if I remember cor ectly. 
 
It was Ed Cole of General Motors, no, it wasn't Ed Cole, it was Pete Estes of General, Pete Estes, 
John Ricardo of Chrysler, a guy named Jerry Myers who as a vice president of American 
Motors, and it may have been Lee Iacocca with Ford.  And the, they came in and expressed the 
outrage that Congress would have the temerity to tell th m how to build cars, and it was a very 
contentious meeting.  And I observed afterwards that i  was the first time that the auto company 
executives had ever felt that they had any responsibility to deal with the Congress of the United 
States.  And Muskie observed that if the people he saw in that room were any measure of 
America's captains of industry, he could understand why the Japanese were beating us 
technologically.  But that, all that meeting did, I think, was steel his resolve.  And I think that 
probably happened to a number of people. 
 
I think, you know, one of the interesting things about the Clean Air Act of 1970, which would 
not be terribly interesting to anybody but a historian, is that the Clean Air Act passed 
unanimously.  Even though, and Phil Hart voted for it, Bob Griffin of Michigan, who had taken 
the floor and strenuously opposed the bill, passed, did not vote.  And that's what caused Gene 
McCarthy to say to Muskie on the elevator on the way off the floor, he said, “Well Ed, you 
finally found an issue that's better than motherhood.  There are some people out there who are 
opposed to motherhood.” 
 
DN:    Now, after, during this period, who was the first administrator of EPA? 
 
LB:    Ruckelshaus, Bill Ruckelshaus from Indiana. 
 
DN:    And they were not playing a role.  Did they start with a role in '71? 
 
LB:    Yeah, they started with their role in '71 and they, when Ruckelshaus went out to 
California and announced that it was insane to try to implement the Clean Air Act, and basically 
destroyed the efforts that Mayor Bradley of Los Angeles was making to try to achieve the 
objectives he had.  It was interesting that the administration, Ruckelshaus administration, did a 
pretty good job on the, their responsibilities with respect to auto emissions, but they did a terrible 
job with their responsibilities to implement the regulatory structure.  They undermined it at every 
opportunity. 
 
DN:    And from your point of view, was that deliberate policy? 
 
LB:    Oh yeah, yeah.  I mean this was, you know, it's hard to put it in context, and I've tried to 
do this with some of the things I've spoken about and written over the years.  The reason the 
Clean Air Act occurred, the reasons were: Number on, the fact that environment had become an 
attractive, unifying issue in the country.  Number two, the fact that Ed Muskie saw an 
opportunity in a crisis and maximized the response to it.  Number three, a unique combination of 
United States senators sitting on that committee.  Number four, a staff that had developed, in 
large part because of the relationship between the senators, a capacity to work together which 
was very different than any other staff on the Hill, part of which was growing out of you and Bill 
Hildenbrand, who was Boggs' person, and part of it evolving through me and Tom Jorling and 
others. 
 
And then finally, the fact that there was no, while th re was no organized environmental lobby, 
there was also no organized business lobby.  You had the trade associations, the Chamber, NEM, 
American Petroleum and Paper, and so on.  But the trad  associations were not effective 
lobbyists.  By and large, with the exception of Senator Randolph and some of the more 
conservative older members of the committee, nobody on the committee had any truck with 
them.  I mean, they just didn't consider them to be credible, they had virtually no access to the 
members.  Their, it was, our disdain for them was so great that we would work very hard to find 
a representative of a company within an industry to testify, rather than listening to the trade 
association because it wasn't of any value, there was no contribution to make. 
 
And so that, in every essence, Muskie caught the business community before it was organized to 
deal with an issue like this, and took it well beyond where they would be able to deal with it in 
the future.  And, you know, we've spent the last thir y years defending it, but it was, he, he, he 
saw how high they could jump and set the bar much hig er than they would ever be able to. 
 
And so that, that probably, I think those are the elem nts.  To a degree they were there two years 
later for the Clean Water Act, but the dynamics of the Clean Air Act were truly unique among 
the legislative initiatives.  And I suspect over time, you know, you will read about other pieces of 
legislation.  And I suspect that today the business r form legislation that [Senator Paul S.] 
Sarbanes got through has a piece of that, but I don't thi k you'll find any place in American 
history, a bill that was as far reaching as the Clean Air Act get enacted with such rapidity and 
with such unanimity, and with such scope as the Clean Air Act. 
 
And that was because of Muskie's, Muskie had a unique vision.  He'd thought a lot about these 
things when they weren't popular, he had the capacity to out wait his opponents.  He never got up 
and left the room, which was one of the major weaknsses of liberals.  And he would argue with 
anybody about anything for however long they wanted to argue about it.  He would know the 
detail of the subject matter. 
 
There was a provision in the Clean Air Act of 1970 which had to do with patents or warranties or 
something that Dick Royce, who had been chief clerk of the committee at the time, had 
convinced Muskie that it ought to be in there.  And then Royce got contrary instructions from his 
chairman and was told to get the piece out, and the problem was that he had done such a good 
job of convincing Muskie, he couldn't unconvince him about the provision.  And that was the 
way Muskie was.  But his, and it wasn't, you know, I'm willing to take a lot of credit for, you 
know, doing the grunt work on this stuff, but the intellectual capacity and the ability to build a 
consensus, which is the element that's most missing in American politics today, was the essential 
Muskie.  He said to me one time, he said, “Leon, the man that's in the middle is in control,” he 
said, “you just have to be able to define what the extremes are so you can set the middle that you 
want.”  And that's what he did. 
 
DN:    When did he say that to you? 
 
LB:    Oh, he said that to me in the mid-seventies.  We were talking about, after the, after what I 
call the Sam Nunn election of '74 when, you know, we'd had about ten years from the Lyndon 
Johnson election in '64 to the '74 mid-term elections in which there really had been a liberal 
control of both the House and the Senate, numerical control.  And after that election he said, you 
know, “Things are never going to be the same around here any more, because I'm going to find 
myself on the left because somebody else is going t be defining where the middle is.” 
 
DN:    You mentioned John Middleton and the call about the work that had been done by the 
scientists.  He apparently felt reasonably free, evn though he was a senior administration 
official at that point, to call you and to work out arrangements on legislation and 
implementation. 
 
LB:    Yeah, there were no impediments, all the way up to the surgeon general.  The interesting 
thing that has disappeared, one of the things that dis ppeared, the surgeon general was 
considered to be a career public health professional, a d the people who worked for the surgeon 
general were considered to be career public health professionals.  Even though Middleton was 
brought in out of the Air Quality Research Laboratoy in Riverside, California, he was never 
considered to be a political appointment.  And he, his job was to be as professional as possible.  
He clearly believed in his mission, because he wasn't in any way constrained.  And to my 
knowledge, there was never any effort made to constrai  he or his fellows, whether it was 
people, the medical doctors and researchers who researched Triangle Park, like Jack Finkley, or 
Middleton or other. 
 
DN:    Now, you mentioned that the environmentalists were not organized in the late sixties and 
into seventy.  As we look back, it's hard to recognize that, thinking about what's happened since 
then.  Why hadn't they gotten organized during that period? 
 
LB:    Well, I don't think they had an issue.  The Sierra Club, if it existed before 1970 as a 
national organization, wasn't focused on environmental issues, it was focused on conservation 
issues.  There was no, the word environment wasn't even used then, and we still have a 
confusion, I mean, you know, we had some wonderful support from some of the old line 
conservation groups like the Wildlife Federation and so on, that the, I'm trying to remember what 
Lou Clapper's outfit was, Izaak Walton League.  Izaak Walton League was a great supporter - 
 
End of Side A 
Side B 
 
DN:    This is the second side of the interview with Leon Billings on the 16th of September, 
2002.  You were talking about the environmental groups. 
 
LB:    And the conservation groups were more interested in water pollution than they were in air 
pollution.  The most significant environmental group of the sixties was the League of Women 
Voters.  And they, for them, Clean Air was an organizing tool, and they were very deeply 
involved in the regional air quality standards issues and so on, and they didn't see it as a partisan 
issue, which made it possible for them to take the issue and run with it.  But there was no, there 
was virtually no organizations that were out there other than that to care about whether people 
could breathe or not.  The Lung Association didn't really exist in that context, though my 
recollection is that in some of regional field hearings we would get Thoracic Society 
representation and so on.  But the whole organized environmental phenomena didn't really start 
until the mid-seventies. 
 
DN:    But during that period, Ralph Nader attacked Ed Muskie, or his people did. 
 
LB:    An interesting era.  Yes. 
 
DN:    What was the background of that? 
 
LB:    Well, I've never quite understood it.  John Esposito was, I think, the author or the principal 
author of a book called Vanishing Air [Vanishing Air: The Ralph Nader Study Group Report on 
Air Pollution.  Viking Press:1970], in which Ed Muskie accused, I mean in which Ralph Nader 
accused Ed Muskie of being a captive of the paper companies, and writing national 
environmental policy in a manner that benefitted the paper companies of Maine.  And the, it hit a 
pretty sore nerve and Muskie reacted to it, and his reaction is in the archives.  He put out a very 
elaborate statement which we all worked on.  In retrospect he probably shouldn't have.  But in 
any event, he reacted to it and part of, I believe, part of the stimulus for him reaching well 
beyond the structure of the legislation we had originally been considering, was to be able to 
effectively eliminate the criticism or the challenge that he wasn't sufficiently environmental in 
his . . . . And I really, I really think that Nader so angered him that he wanted to make absolutely 
sure that that charge would not stand.  And, well, h  did. 
 
Nader, you know, Nader, interestingly enough, and this is a vignette that's not in anybody's 
biography.  We had a provision in the Clean Air Actin 1970 that Nader didn't like.  It had to do 
with some informational requirement in the auto provisions.  And he called me and he said, and 
he asked me to change it.  And I told him I couldn't o that because the conferees had already 
signed off on it.  And he said, “They'll never know.”  And I said, “Are you, Ralph, are you 
suggesting that I should change a provision of law that the conferees have already agreed to 
without telling them?  Isn't that dishonorable?”  And he hung up on me. 
 
And then later that day I got two telephone calls, both of which were from acquaintances, one of 
which was from a friend, telling me that I could never reveal that Nader had asked me to change 
the outcome of that piece of legislation, knowing full well that the conference had signed off on 
it, or else, quote, ‘he would get me’.  I mean, this, e was not highly regarded by a lot of us.  But 
his attack on Muskie certainly stimulated a response. 
 
DN:    Now the, from '70 to '72, following the Clean Air ct, during that period and after, 
Senator Muskie was involved in his own quest for the presidential nomination.  How did that 
affect your work on, during the time of his campaign, how did it affect your work and the work 
of the committee? 
 
LB:    Well, the, at some point in '71 we actually organized an official designation of Tom 
Eagleton to be vice chairman of the subcommittee, so that we could conduct hearings and carry 
on activities.  And Eagleton stepped in and did everything that Muskie ordinarily would have 
done.  Though there was, in that period, times when Muskie would become re-engaged in the 
work of the subcommittee, much to the frustration of the people who were by then running the 
office and running the campaign, because they thougt we were diverting him, or distracting him 
from the campaign trail.  And in fact, he very much wanted to be diverted and distracted from 
the campaign trail.  And I, you know, I never examined the psychology of it, though I was 
certainly the beneficiary of much of the anger about it, but he continued to play a role. 
 
He, if I remember correctly, John [Varick] Tunney [D-CA] was elected in the '70 election, and 
he became a member of the subcommittee.  And Tunney decided, I think he was elected in '70 
[John Tunney was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1970, after serving three terms as a 
Congressman].  Anyway, he decided that he would craft a concept for water quality that was the 
parallel of Muskie's concept for air quality.  And I and other members of the staff had extensive 
meetings with Tunney and his two staff people, Jane Frank, who is now Congresswoman Jane 
Harmon, and David Cathcart, and Tunney, talking about his idea to have a national water quality 
standard. 
 
And at one point, again I've, I'd have to go back and review notes to put the exact time on this, 
but it may have been in '72.  I'm not, I just don't have, I can tell you that we passed the Clean 
Water Act in 7—, on October 16th of '72, but there's some time frames I haven't put together in 
my mind.  But anyway, I wrote a memo to Muskie saying that Tunney has this idea, and I don't 
think it will work for this reason, and I had given Tunney every one of these reasons in these 
private meetings.  So Muskie comes in to an executive session, a mark-up session, and he 
proceeds to read my memo in its entirety.  And Tunney turned red in the face, he accused me of 
being a quisling, a traitor, and stomped out of the room. 
 
But in any event, the, Muskie was somewhat but not wholly disengaged from that process.  He 
was very much engaged in shaping what became the Clean Water Act, because we did in fact go 
through a very intense period in which we discussed what kind of a structure would be required 
to get the Clean Water Act to work.  And he was integrally involved in the decision to abandon 
the water quality standards as the regulatory mechanism, and just come up with the concept of 
effluent limitations as the regulatory mechanism, and ultimately was the key member of the 
conference committee.  When, my recollection is actu lly, that we passed the Clean Water Act in 
the fall of '71.  And there was a hearing, maybe it was later than fall, but Muskie was deeply 
involved, and I think his involvement in 1971 in anything, ticked off the campaign people who 
were trying to control events. 
 
The House held a hearing on it December 6th, 1971 in wh ch Nelson Rockefeller characterized 
the Clean Water, the Senate-passed Clean Water Act as a rillion dollar mistake.  And I 
remember that Muskie said at the time, “Only Nelson Rockefeller would know what a trillion 
dollars is.”  Anyway, then the House just sat on the bill, and didn't do anything with it.  They, 
actually they met in December and they voted the bill out, but they didn't file a report for four 
months.  I think that's what happened.  And in the meantime Muskie was off winning New 
Hampshire, or losing it, and then he came back and was a conferee. 
 
But also in the interim, John [Anton] Blatnik had a heart attack, he was then chairman of the 
House committee, and his place was taken over by a guy named Ray Roberts.  Roberts was not 
John Blatnik on the whole, it took . . . . Had Muskie not come back we would not have survived 
the Clean Water Act, because the, his idea of having, building on technology as a means of 
controlling effluence, going from best practical technology, best available technology, and 
implementing the Corps of Engineers permit program, transferring it to law and so on, would 
never have gotten through if he had not been the chairman of the conference committee. 
 
Now, here's an interesting point, the, midway through our consideration of the Clean Water Act, 
the court upheld a very obscure 1899 law called the Refuse Act of 1899.  And that law is very 
simple, it said that the discharge of pollutants ino av-, of oil or other pollution into the 
navigable waters of the United States, is a felony a d subject to, not only to penalty, but also you 
can collect bounties if you identified somebody who was violating it.  And needless to say, this 
caused some Sturm und Drang among the business community.  Russell Train was then
chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality, and he wanted to handle, he wanted to create 
regulations to regulate discharges.  And Muskie, we had a provision in our bill which responded 
to that need, and the House didn't want to go along with it. 
 
So Muskie, and I think the only time I've ever seen or heard of this up to today, arranged to have 
a hearing, have the conference committee hold a hearing.  And it was held in the F100, and he 
had Russell Train come up and explain why they needed a permit program.  And essentially 
using that vehicle and the arguments that he advanced i  that forum, which was a seminar for the 
House Rules, managed to get the House members to buy n to the permit program.  I mean, and 
that was, that was a beauty to behold.  I mean it was quite, just, it was so well orchestrated, and it 
was orchestrated in an intellectual perspective.  Muskie really liked Russell Train.  Russell Train 
was probably the, was then at CQ, he later became an EPA administrator, and Muskie liked him 
in both capacities.  They had a capacity to communicate that was pretty rare as far as I was 
concerned. 
 
DN:    You had a chance to observe that develop.  Do you remember how it started, how it got 
under way, and how they interacted directly? 
 
LB:    No, I really don't.  I know that, I recall one instance, this was some years later, in which 
Muskie and Train were meeting, and he may have beenthe EPA administrator at the time.  And 
Train said, “You know, my experience has been that in ny given period of time I can get one or 
two things out of the White House.  So I'm very careful about what I ask for, because I want to 
make sure I get it.”  And, I mean, that approach really pleased Muskie, because he saw the 
wisdom of, I mean, he'd heard Ruckelshaus say,   “Well, you know, I talked to Nixon for over 
half an hour and he spent twenty-five minutes talking about various county chairmen in the state 
of Indiana, and I never get around to what I went in there to see him, but fortunately it was just 
he and I, so I could tell the people outside whatever I wanted to.” 
 
Train, and Train, you know, Train was honest with Muskie.  He would say, look, you know, 
Muskie would say, you know, “You never do it my way, you always do it somebody else's way.” 
 And he said,  “Well, you're on my side already.  It's the other guys I've got to influence.”  But it 
was a nice relationship, and I think it maintained.  I on't know how often they saw each other, 
but they certainly had a great deal of respect for each other.  And I think also there was sort of an 
old school aspect to the relationship, even though Train came from a significantly different 
economic background, I think there were some old school ties. 
 
DN:    How did Muskie and Ruckelshaus interact? 
 
LB:    For the most part pretty well.  I mean, Ruckelshaus was shrewd, he, he did some things 
which really irritated Muskie, like his ridicule of the Clean Air Act in Los Angeles.  On the other 
hand, when he made the decision with respect to extending the deadline for the auto industries, 
even though, auto industry, even though Chrysler clearly had violated the good faith provisions, 
Muskie was satisfied that it was a very thoughtful and legally structured decision and he 
respected that.  The problem I had is, the nice thing about Russell Train is that, and he left after 
Gerry Ford, and Ruckelshaus came back around, and I'm not sure that, I'm not sure, I have to sort 
that out, I really haven't, you know, if he had left government at the same time as Muskie and not 
come back I'd probably have a better sense in my own mind. 
 
DN:    After the '72 election, and after the Clean Water Act of '72, where did your attention turn 
in environmental legislation? 
 
LB:    Well, you know, in, after the presidential election we had a period of, I would say 
despondency on Muskie's part, and perhaps on my part, too.  He wasn't very interested in doing 
any of the things that I was doing, and I wasn't very interested in spending any time with him.  
And so, you know, he actually, and it's really important to get in this oral history, went off and 
worked on the War Powers Act.  Hopefully you'll have a chance to talk to Brian Atwood at some 
time about that, because Brian was one of the staff people.  But he, you know, he was, he had 
decided after the election, the failed election, that he was going to become engaged in foreign 
policy and be a big thinker, and he wasn't going to spend his time in the tedium of the Senate. 
 
I actively sought the job as administrative assistant, nd he told me that I was unprepared for the 
priorities that he was interested in, and that's why he offered the job to Maynard Toll who was 
very much the international type.  And so we, with the exception of really extensive hearings in 
'73 and '74 on the whole question of the National Academy of Sciences study, and the 
automobile emissions extension, we did some little things, but we didn't do a lot.  It really wasn't 
until '75 that he re-engaged, because the Clean Air Act had, the, it was pretty clear the auto 
emissions, the auto companies weren't going to meetth  NOx standards and the standards for 
oxides and nitrogen, so the Clean Air Act needed to be extended. 
 
Also, there was a huge problem with the discharge of dredge and fill material in water programs. 
 So in the '75-'76 period we began a process of what Muskie referred to as a “mid-course 
correction” in the Clean Air and Clean Water Act.  And the, we actually got quite a long ways.  
The issues had changed: we'd had a Supreme Court decision on prevention of significant 
deterioration, we'd had the auto issues, we had pretty cl arly some implementation issues, and so 
we set about trying to craft a bill that kept things moving forward without closing the country 
down. 
 
And we ultimately passed a bill through the Senate, got a bill through conference with the 
House, and it got to the Senate floor, and [Edwin Jacob] Jake Garn of Utah insisted that the 
conference report be read and, you know, I think that was a lame duck session also.  And finally 
around four o'clock in the morning we gave up the gost and let the bill die,  Muskie recognizing 
that that was problematic because the auto companies didn't have standards, they had standards 
they couldn't meet, and so we would have to come back in the next year. 
 
In the Clean Water Act case, the House wouldn't compr ise on the dredge and fill issue, and 
they were really arrogant about it.  And for some reason, Muskie wasn't there and I took the bill 
down, and I just, I just left, and so that bill endd up dying.  But I, I'm not exactly sure why 
Muskie wasn't there, he may have been in conference o  something else, but, oh, you know 
what, we've left out a whole chapter here and we got to go back. 
 
In the '73-'74 period, there was a thing called the en rgy crisis, and the, there was an attempt to 
gut the Clean Air Act in this emergency energy legislat on.  And the, Jim Schlesinger, who was 
then secretary of energy, and his pet dog Al Alm (well I shouldn't say that about him because 
he's no longer with us), but anyway, came to see Muskie and, actually invited Muskie to the 
White House for lunch.  And he and I went down, andSchlesinger told Muskie that there were 
some unimaginable number of power plants in this country that couldn't convert from oil to coal, 
because of  the Clean Air Act. 
 
Well, it was a lie.  When we got back, I checked it ou .  There were, I think he said over a 
hundred power plants; well there were over a hundred power plants that were burning oil, but 
there were only sixteen power plants that had the capability of converting from oil to coal.  And 
Muskie was absolutely outraged that a person in a position like Schlesinger would just outright 
lie to him, and he called him on it.  And I think he wrote him a letter, and I think that's probably 
in the archives, too. 
 
And so we went to conference the, this was the winter of '73, early '74, we went to conference 
with the House.  And it was one of those conference committees in which there was a cast of 
thousands.  I have to tell you a vignette first.  I walked into one of the staff meetings, and all 
these staff people were sitting around in the room.  So somebody from either, from the 
conference committee, House or Senate, said “Well, L on's here, let's talk about the Clean Air 
provisions of the agreement.”  And I looked at him and I said, “Leon didn't come here to discuss 
the Clean Air provisions with you.  Senator Muskie has instructed me to talk about them with 
Congressman Rogers, and I'll talk about them with his staff, but they're not subject, you have 
nothing to do with it.”  And I looked around and said, “Seeing nobody from Roger's staff here, 
I'll go back to my office,” and I turned around and left.  And that stopped that. 
 
Well anyway, so then we finally got the principals together and, you know, it was pretty clear 
that everybody wanted to pounce on the Clean Air Act.  In the first place, Muskie was not in a 
good mood.  And so he listened to this for a while, and suddenly he pulls, he reaches in a pocket, 
he pulls out a letter and he, a folded letter, and he says,  “This is a letter from Adlai Stevenson, 
Senator Adlai Stevenson, the thrust of which is that if we weaken the Clean Air Act, he'll 
filibuster this conference report and we'll never gt it passed.  So if that's what you want to do, 
let me know so I can tell Senator Stevenson.”  Well everybody, you know, “Oh no, oh no.”  And 
so Muskie said, “If that's not what you want to do,Paul [Rogers] and I will work, Paul and I will 
work something out and we'll get back to you.”  Well, they did, we did, we got it done. 
 
That letter was written by a guy named Len Dickwood, and the letter said something like, you 
know, “Gee, Ed, I really hope that you won't weaken any of the provisions of the Clean Air Act 
because I really care about the Clean Air Act.”  And so it was this totally innocuous letter, but it 
was, you know, you couldn't have played a better poker bluff than that one, and he got his way 
with it.  (Pause - interrupted by staff) 
 
LB:    Now, skipping back to the Clean Air Act, so they, in '76 both the Clean Air Act, as a 
result of the Garn filibuster, and the Clean Water Act as a result of the Dick Sullivan filibuster, 
Dick Sullivan being a former chief counsel of the House committee who didn't believe me when 
I said I'd take the bill down rather than compromise with him, having learned that from Muskie. 
 
We came back in '77 and we had, we had a couple of problems.  The auto companies needed to 
know what their emissions standards were going to be by turnaround time, which is the first 
week in August, when they shifted to the next year's models.  And the, Muskie didn't want to 
compromise on the auto emissions standards too early. 
 
One of the enormous skills that Muskie had was determining the right time for making a deal.  
And we, there were a number of issues in the Clean Air Act, including the PSD issue, prevention 
of significant deterioration.  And so I talked to Hward Baker and I said, “Look, I know you 
want to go from a .4 NOx standard to a 1.0 NOx standard, and I absolutely promise you that 
before the bill passes the Senate we'll have a 1.0 NOx standard.  But the auto companies want a 
lot more than that, and we can't afford to give it to hem, and Muskie doesn't want to compromise 
with you until the compromise with you becomes the compromise that passes the Senate.”  And 
Baker said basically, all right, but don't expletive deleted diddle me, and I mean, he was finger in 
the chest type. 
 
So we went to the floor and there was this young senator named Don Riegle who had an auto 
industry amendment, and he didn't know that we had a deal with Baker.  So he offered his 
amendment, and I went over to Baker and I said, now.  Baker stood up, offered his amendment 
as a substitute, it was adopted, and Riegle didn't know what hit him.  And in fact he came up to 
me afterwards, he says, I guess the next time I do this I should know what the rules are.  But this 
thing was a total Muskie orchestration.  So we got out of the Senate with what we wanted. 
 
By this time, because of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1976, the House committees had 
been reorganized.  And when they did away with the old Merchant Marine Fisheries Committee, 
some aspect of its jurisdiction was transferred to the Commerce Committee, and along with that 
came one John Dingell.  John Dingell had succeeded in taking control of the committee away 
from Paul Rogers, who was then subcommittee chairman, and he had gotten an amendment 
through, an auto industry amendment through on auto standards, and then, on the floor.  And 
John Breaux, of Louisiana, had gotten a similar amendment to the PSD provisions through on the 
House floor.  And under the then extant House rules, if you prevailed on an amendment on the 
floor of the House, you became a member of the confere ce committee. 
 
So we had for the first time a real conference with the House, where Dingell, who wasn't chair, 
refused to compromise on auto emission standards.  And because he and Breaux were both on 
the conference committee on the majority side with the Republicans, they controlled the majority 
of the conference committee.  And Muskie kept saying, you know, “I've gone as far as I want to 
go.  There aren't any auto plants in Maine.  If youwant to close down the auto companies, then 
that's your decision.”  And all of this just drove Dingell nuts, I mean he just . . . . 
 
Finally the, and Jennings Randolph was an absolute nervous wreck.  And one of the staff people 
had painted some dice with the standards on them, .4 NOx, .1 NOx, .9 CO.  And Randolph 
actually proposed, in a backroom session of the committee, throwing the dice to determine what 
our position ought to be, and then tried to get Muskie to go along with it.  And Muskie, Muskie 
looked at Randolph, I mean this was probably as nasty as I ever saw him with Randolph, he said, 
“Jennings, we're not children here, this is serious b iness.”  And interestingly enough, in putting 
Randolph down that way, all the rest of the committee members backed off.  And he said, 
Muskie said, “Dingell will give in if we hold fast.” 
 
And so we went back in, and I remember Wendell Anderson, a senator from Minnesota, made 
this really ludicrous speech about how he couldn't jog any more because the air was so dirty.  
And finally, Dingell threw up his hands, swore, stormed out of the room.  Rogers called the vote, 
and the Muskie provision was accepted.  And then came PSD which was still outstanding, and 
Breaux started looking around for Dingell because without Dingell he didn't have the votes.  And 
Dingell refused to come back into the room because he needed to get the bill out of there, so he 
let, you know, basically Rogers conceded to the Senate position, or the staff negotiated position 
on PSD, and we got the bill through. 
 
But it was, it was absolute, you know, that whole period of time it was Muskie's willingness to 
sit on his butt and not move, you know.  Now of course, part of this time he was in a wheel chair 
because he'd had these back problems.  In fact, at one point we had a conference committee 
meeting in the Senate Appropriations Committee hearing room, and it was on the water bill.  
And Jim McClure was there, and Quentin Burdick was there, and John Chafee was there, and it 
was really difficult for me because I didn't have anybody there who was anywhere close to 
Muskie philosophically.  But Jim McClure insisted tha  we follow Muskie's lead, even though he 
was in the hospital. 
 
I had gone out to the hospital the night before, and Muskie was talking to me about rats on the 
ceiling, he was under some kind of medication right after, either right before or after his surgery. 
 So McClure and Burdick said, “Well you're going to have to call Ed and ask him what we do.”  
So I went up to the phone on the corner and I called Dial-A-Prayer and carried on, the only time 
I did this in the fifteen years I was with Ed Muskie, I called Dial-A-Prayer and asked, ‘what I 
should do?’  And I came back and [said], “He said, ‘tell them no’.”  And I, you know, I talked to 
him about this later when he was, and he agreed that I did the right thing.  I always figured with 
Muskie that “no” was the least dangerous response. 
 
But anyway, so . . . . we got the Clean Air Act through.  And during that time, in May of that 
year, we had a meeting at the White House, Muskie, Dingell, Jimmy Carter, myself and some 
other staff, in which, and Paul Rogers, in which Dingell and Muskie respectively made their 
positions to the president, and known to the president.  And I think afterwards the president 
indicated that he had sided with Muskie, he told Dingell he sided with Muskie.  No, it must have 
been before, because when we went out of the room I shook hands with him and told him who I 
was.  And he said, “Oh, I know who you are, you're the subject of the second most unpleasant 
conversation I've had since I've been president.”  And I said, “Oh, what was the first?”  He said, 
“When I told Dingell I wasn't going to go along with him on auto emission standards.” 
 
Anyway, the, I mean that was where I think, it was one thing for Muskie to guide through the '70 
Act, or even the '72 Act, when he had a substantial pub ic majority, a perception of the urgency 
of the problem, significant liberal support in the S nate, a committee that was very strongly in 
his favor.  It was quite another thing in 1977 with a very different Congress, not only a different 
House because of their rules, and Dingell and Breaux's success, but the Senate which was now a 
much more conservative institution, for him to be ale to pull off something that in essence 
preserved the underlying laws pretty much intact.  There were compromises we probably didn't 
want to make, but they were all compromises that were within parameters of acceptability, they 
never really got outside.  And that was a unique legis ative skill. 
 
DN:    And he was exercising that in spite of enormous physical difficulties. 
 
LB:    Yeah, his, as I said, I don't think he, I know he went to some of the Clean Air Act 
conferences in a wheel chair, and he was in great pain.  I don't think he attended but maybe one 
of the last of the Clean Water Act conferences.  You know, the Clean Water Act of '72 I think 
had forty-five, forty-four mark ups and forty-five conferences, forty-four committee meetings, 
and forty-five conferences.  Can you imagine doing that today?  Just amazing. 
 
DN:    Not the same kind of commitments.  We're virtually t the end of this tape; let's take a 
break here. 
 
End of Interview 
